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Abstract
This paper develops and tests a simple model of parental allocations which stresses the
e¢ ciency-equity tradeo¤ they face when investing in children of varying ability. The empirical
component of the paper focuses on inequalities in schooling and child labour. Using sibling-
based xed e¤ect models, I show that large di¤erences in IQ test scores between siblings
do not translate into large di¤erences in schooling. The evidence also suggests that richer
households compensate more than poorer ones. On child labour participation, the data show
that there is a great deal of variation amongst brothers along this margin. If parents take
compensating action they may be able to attenuate any harmful e¤ects arising from these
di¤erences. I show that in fact there are substantial adverse e¤ects: participation in paid
employment during elementary school leads to rise of 8 percentage points in the probability
of being a¤ected by one of seven acute morbidity conditions. These results suggest that even
if parents act to compensate along some dimensions, in the end they may be forced to pick
and choose amongst their children for other allocations, leading to large inequalities.
Email: iftikhar.hussain@economics.ox.ac.uk
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1 Introduction
Understanding the role of the family in transmitting inequality is a question of public policy
concern. A better appreciation of parental behaviour has the potential to improve the design
of poverty alleviation programmes.1 A handful of empirical studies in the economics literature,
focusing on outcomes such as education, earnings and health status, have attempted to determine
whether parents reinforce or compensate for endowment di¤erences amongst their o¤spring. But
there does not appear to be a rm consensus, with some studies nding evidence of reinforcing
behaviour (Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman 1994) whilst others nd that parents act in a
compensating manner (Griliches 1979, Ashenfelter and Rouse 1998 and Ermisch and Francesconi
2000).
In this paper I develop a simple theoretical model of human capital investment with multiple
o¤spring, in the spirit of Becker and Tomes (1976) and Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1982).
The model predicts that rich parents invest to maximise returns, so that the marginal return to
investment equals the cost of capital, i.e. the market rate of return. Any income inequalities
amongst adult children are o¤set via transfers. Less rich, credit constrained parents face an
e¢ ciency-equity tradeo¤ when allocating investments amongst children of di¤erent abilities. If
parents invest e¢ ciently then the marginal product of human capital is again equalised across
siblings, leading to adult income inequality amongst siblings.2 Parents can o¤set some of this
inequality by investing more in the less able child. Thus the simplest benchmark economic model
predicts that the ability-investment relationship is strongest (or at least no less strong) in richer
households than in poorer ones. In other words, richer parents reinforce more for endowment
di¤erences amongst their children than do poorer parents.3
However, this prediction is sensitive to the exact formulation of parentspreferences. In partic-
ular, if parents care about childrens education, rather than their income, so that schooling enters
directly parents utility function - as in the paternalistic preferences view discussed by Pollak
(1998) - and if it is costly to take compensating action, then the relationship between ability and
schooling will be weaker for richer households than for poorer ones. In sum, theory alone cannot
guide whether the rich will reinforce more than the poor.4
I use Mexican data to address two key empirical issues. The rst is to ask whether parents
1Becker (1991, Chapter 6), for example, has argued that education programmes which target individual children
may be undone by parents who in e¤ect react in a compensating manner by devoting greater resources to non-
participating children and to themselves.
2It is assumed that the return on human capital for each child in credit constrained households is above the
market rate of return.
3Another interpretation of this result is that role of ability changes with opportunity. Richer parents invest to
full their childs potential. In poorer families it does not matter whether a child is able or not - given the limited
resources available, all children will end with the same low level of schooling. In a di¤erent context, but consistent
with the role of opportunity, Card (2001) shows that the relationship between ability (IQ) and schooling is stronger
for men in the US who grew up near a college than for those who did not.
4If in poor families the more able sibling can commit, or parents can compel her, to compensate the less able
sibling in adult life, then this will be another reason why poor households may in fact engage in strongly reinforcing
behaviour.
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reinforce or compensate for IQ di¤erences amongst their children when making schooling decisions.
I investigate whether this relationship between ability and schooling changes with family income.
The evidence does not support strong reinforcing behaviour. In particular, richer parents appear
to compensate more than poorer ones.
Despite these ndings rejecting strong reinforcing behaviour, large inequalities in parental
allocations remain. In particular, evidence presented below shows that there is a great deal of
variation within the family on the child labour participation margin. When deciding to engage a
child in work, there may be good reasons why parents do not allocate some child labour to each
child, equalising marginal disutility of work across children. Two possible reasons are xed costs
associated with child labour participation and the timing of adverse income shocks (if increased
child labour participation is a response to such shocks then only children of a given age at that
point in time will be eligiblefor participation). Under these circumstances, even though parents
may be averse to inequalities between their children, they may nevertheless be forced to pick and
choose amongst their young children for income generating work.
This leads into the second key empirical question addressed in this paper: Do di¤erences in
child labour participation within the family matter in the long run? More specically, I ask: What
are the long-term health e¤ects of child labour? If parents can take compensating action then it
may be that any adverse consequences of working as a child are mitigated. The empirical evidence
suggests that the long-term health consequences for the working child are in fact quite severe.
Even if parents act in a compensating manner on the ability-schooling dimension, it would appear
that they are unable to undo the harmful e¤ects on the sibling who participated in child labour.5
The data employed in this study are from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), which
has a number of very attractive features for the design of this study. Each individual in the family
over the age of 15 is interviewed and provides, amongst many other things, detailed information
on current and past schooling. This includes not just grade attainment, but also information on
grade repetition, the age of quitting school and whether the individual worked for pay during
elementary school. This level of detail permits the use of potentially superior measures of parental
investments than has been the case in previous studies, which have typically used attainment and
wages of adult children.
Interviewees also take an IQ test. Using this test score as a direct measure of the individuals
endowment, I estimate pooled and family xed e¤ect models for siblings in order to determine
whether parents reinforce or compensate for ability di¤erences.6 A potential disadvantage with
this approach is that the IQ test score may itself be determined by schooling.7 Fortunately, the IQ
measure used, the Ravens Progressive Matrices test (Raven 1956), is believed to be less contami-
5Child labour is dened in this study as participation in an income generating activity during elementary school.
6At the end of his celebrated paper, Griliches (1979, Table 2), uses exactly this idea to speculate that parents
compensate for ability di¤erences amongst their children.
7One further potential concern with this empirical startegy is the possibility of attenuation bias in xed e¤ect
methods when classical measurement error is present (see, for example, Griliches 1977, 1979 and Ashenfelter and
Krueger 1995). In fact the results show that some of the within estimates are close to or even larger in magnitude
than the pooled estimates, suggesting that this issue may not be of rst order importance.
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nated by schooling than is the case for most verbal reasoning tests.8 The Ravens test (which has
been extensively used in industrial and developing countries - see, for example, Boissiere, Knight
and Sabot 1985 and Raven 2000) involves matching pictorial patterns and does not require the
subject to be literate.9
The identication strategy for the analysis of the health consequences of child labour relies on
variation in participation for brothers. The retrospective question in the survey on child labour
participation, combined with a detailed set of health measures, permit the use of sibling-based
family xed e¤ect methods to identify the long-term e¤ects of child labour on health. This strategy
allows me to control for time-invariant unobserved family characteristics which may be correlated
with the child labour decision. Economists have used such models in a variety of settings.10 I am
also able to test the robustness of the xed e¤ect results to the inclusion of controls for important
individual-level characteristics. It should be noted that child labour is a signicant problem in
Mexico: children in the 7 to 14 age group make up 30% of day labourers in the agricultural sector
(US Department of Labor, 1998) and it is estimated that around 10% of children between 10 and
14 years are economically active (ILO, 2001).
Summarising the key results, I nd that there are large di¤erences in IQ within families (the
mean of the di¤erence between high and low ability sibling pairs is close to one whole standard
deviation) but these do not appear to translate into large schooling di¤erences between siblings.
The within family estimates suggest that a one standard deviation rise in own ability relative to
siblings is associated with higher attainment of 0.37 of a grade (mean grade attainment is around
8 grades). The relationship between ability and child labour participation also appears to be quite
weak.
When I investigate the ability-schooling relationship by family income, I nd that richer families
appear to compensate more (reinforce less) than poorer ones: for families where the head has no
schooling, the within family estimates suggest that a one standard deviation rise in own ability
relative to siblings is associated with higher attainment of 0.4 of a grade; for families where the
head has at least some secondary schooling, the corresponding estimate is 0.2. These ndings
are even stronger for other measures of parental schooling investments, such as the age at which
8See, for example, the quasi-experimental evidence presented in Cahan and Cohen (1989) on the e¤ects of
schoolimng on various IQ tests, including Ravens. On the impact of schooling on an ability test popular in the
economics literature, namely the Armed Forces Qualication Test, or AFQT, in the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth, see Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2005).
9Nevertheless, the suspicion remains that this measure reects schooling and so estimates of the impact of ability
will be upward biased. If the coe¢ cient estimates suggest reinforcing behaviour, i.e. where the correlations between
schooling outcomes and ability within families are strong and positive, then we must be cautious in interpreting
this as evidence favouring the reinforcing hypothesis. But if the coe¢ cients suggest compensating behaviour (zero
or negative correlation between schooling and ability within families) then we may be on rmer ground in claiming
that this provides evidence that parents invest to attenuate endowment di¤erences amongst their children.
10Other than the papers cited earlier, examples of studies using sibling and twin methods - which aim to control for
genetic characteristics as well as family xed e¤ects - include evaluations of the returns to education (Griliches 1977,
1979, Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994 and Ashenfelter and Zimmerman 1997), the returns to school quality (Altonji
and Dunn 1996), the impact of Head Start (Currie and Thomas, 1995) and the e¤ects of teenage childbearing
(Geronimus and Korenman 1992 and Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1995).
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the individual quits school. These results suggest that the simplest version of the Becker-Tomes
model, which predicts that the rich should reinforce for endowment di¤erences more than the poor,
is rejected.
On the long-term health e¤ects of child labour, I nd that it is critical to control for unobserved
family xed e¤ects: for example, for one key health outcome, whether as an adolescent or adult
the individual su¤ers from one of seven acute morbidity conditions, the pooled estimates of the
e¤ects of child labour participation for a brothers sample are half the size of those estimated using
family xed e¤ect methods. The within estimates suggest that participation in income generating
work during childhood leads to an 8 percentage point greater likelihood of su¤ering from acute
morbidity (the mean prevalence of acute morbidity for the sample is 9 per cent). These results are
robust to controls for individual ability as well as for current occupation and sector of employment.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it sheds new light on whether parents com-
pensate or reinforce for childrens endowment di¤erences. In addition, as far as I am aware, this
is the rst study to distinguish rich and poor family investment strategies in the compensating-
reinforcing literature. One limitation of the current setup is that it takes a unidimensional view
of childrens endowments - there may well be other endowments on which parents take action.
Nevertheless, given the lack of consensus on this issue, it is valuable to explore a study design
little explored to date.
The second contribution relates to the issue of the long-term health e¤ects of child labour.
There is very limited hard evidence on this topic (see for example the survey by Edmonds, 2007)
and this is one of the rst studies to identify the causal e¤ects of child labour on long-term health.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the theoretical model
and empirical strategy, respectively. Section 4 describes the data and sample selection. Section
5 presents empirical evidence on parental preferences using ability endowments and schooling
outcomes. Section 6 lays out the evidence on inequalities arising from within family variation in
child labour participation, focusing particularly on the health e¤ects of child labour. Section 7
concludes.
2 Intrahousehold Investment in Children: Theory
This section illustrates how ideas of reinforcing and compensating parental behaviour can be
incorporated into standard economic models of human capital investment.
The key ingredients of the model are: parents are altruistic, their preferences being dened over
the distribution of their childrens earnings. Rich and poor parents have the same preferences. Rich
families are not credit constrained but poor families are. There are complementarities between
ability and education investments in the schooling and earnings production functions.11
11Although altruistic preferneces are commonplace in the economic literature, other possibilities should not be
precluded. For example, Parsons and Goldin (1989) argue that nonaltruistic parental behaviour was pervasive
amongst late nineteenth century families in the US. Models of exchange (Bernheim et al 1985, Cox 1987 and Light
and McGarry 2004), where parental transfers are payments for child services such as regular contact and care,
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2.1 The Basic Setup
This simple model assumes that there are two periods and two children in the household. Chil-
drens consumption when adults is c1 and c2, and is composed of own income and parental transfers.
Parentsutility function is CES in their childrens adult consumption. There are no transfers be-
tween siblings. x represents total resources allocated by parents to children and is assumed to be
separable from other expenditures. Of the total x each child i receives hi in the form of education
investment and a monetary transfer, ti, when adult. Child i earnings (yi) next period, depend on
own endowment (or ability), i, and human capital investment, hi. Furthermore, the earnings pro-
duction function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas: yi = Aihdi . Prices for education expenditure,
hi, are the same for all children; assumed to be unity.
Case 1: Rich parents, leave bequests
In this case x is largeand parents leave transfers (bequests) ti. Parentsproblem is as follows:
max
hi;ti
u(c1; c2) = (c

1 + c

2)
1
 (1)
s.t.
x = h1 + t1 + h2 + t2
y1 = A1h
d
1 , y2 = A
b
2h
d
2 (d < 1)
c1
1 + r
=
y1
1 + r
+ t1
c2
1 + r
=
y2
1 + r
+ t2
The solution to this maximisation problem is such that parents invest in childrens education until
the marginal product of human capital, @yi
@hi
, falls to the market rate of return, 1 + r, so that
education investment:
h1 =

Ad1
1 + r
 1
1 d
; h2 =

Ad2
1 + r
 1
1 d
(2)
Any inequalities in investments and earnings are o¤set by parental transfers so that parents do
not trade o¤ e¢ ciency and equity: the solutions for transfers are t1 = 12 (x  h1   h2) + 12
 
y2 y1
1+r

and t2 = 12 (x  h1   h2) + 12
 
y2 y1
1+r

and so c1 and c2 are equal.
Two clear, unambiguous predictions emerge from this model.
 First, inequality in human capital investment is determined by di¤erences in endowments,
have been discussed in the literature on inter vivos transfers and bequests. Pollak (1989) postulates paternalitic
prefernces where parents care directly about the childs consumption set.
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the higher ability child receiving greater investments12: h1
h2
=

1
2
 1
1 d
, so that
lnh1   lnh2 = 1
1  d (ln 1   ln 2) . (3)
 Second, as equation (2) shows, own investment does not depend on siblings endowment, so
that @hj
@k
= 0.
Case 2: Poorer, credit constrained parents
The maintained assumption now is that x is small, such that the returns on education invest-
ment remain above the market rate of return, 1 + r. In this case the total budget allocated to
children, x, is not large enough to leave bequests, so that t1 and t2 are set to 0 in the parents
optimization problem. The solution for education investment is then:
h1 =

1 + 
x; h2 =
1
1 + 
x where  =

1
2
 
1 d
: (4)
So that the human capital investment ratio for the two siblings is h1
h2
=

1
2
 
1 d
, and in logs:13
lnh1   lnh2 = 
1  d (ln 1   ln 2) . (5)
In this version of the model parents face an equity-e¢ ciency tradeo¤ when investing in their
children. The predictions now depend on the inequality aversion parameter and consequently are
less clear cut than in the with-bequests version of the model (case 1 above). First, equation (4)
demonstrates that sibling ability does inuence own investment, though not if parental preferences
are Cobb-Douglas (i.e.  = 0).
Second, whether the higher ability child receives more or less investment relative to the less
able child depends on the inequality aversion parameter as follows:
1. If  > 0 then the higher ability child receives relatively more investment. For the case 0 <
 < 1 the more able child is allocated greater education investment, but not as much as in the
maximum returns case ( = 1). When  = 1 the utility function becomes linear in childrens
consumption and parents act to maximise the return on their investment, regardless of
distributional consequences - the marginal product of human capital is equalised for the two
children. In this case investment inequality, as measured by h1
h2
, is identical to that in Model
1.
12This translates into inequality in earnings as follows: y1y2 =

1
2
 1
1 d
.
13These investments translate into the following earnings ratio: y1y2 =

1
2
 1
1 d
.
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2.  = 0: Cobb-Douglas utility function. This leads to equal sharing of x amongst the siblings,
i.e. h1
h2
= 1:
3.  < 0: the higher ability child receives relatively less investment, so parents are said to
compensate the less able child for his or her lower endowment. As   !  1, the Leontief
case, earnings inequality is eliminated, so that y1
y2
 ! 1 and h1
h2
 !

1
2
 1
d
.
The various solutions in the two models are illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b. These depict the
marginal return to human capital curves and the equilibrium investment outcomes for high and
low ability children. For the case where parents have su¢ cient resources to o¤set any inequalities
in investments via transfers, parents invest in their children until the marginal return equals the
market rate of return, 1 + r0; in Figure 1a the return-investment solutions are at points M and N
for the low and high ability child respectively. For parents facing credit constraints, for the case
 = 1, i.e. parents maximise returns, the optimal strategy is to invest until the marginal returns
are equalised across siblings - the solution points are P and Q. For  less than 1, on the other
hand, investment in the high ability child shifts leftwards on his own marginal returns curve and
rightwards for the low ability child as  declines, as depicted by the arrows in Figure 1b. When
 = 0 the two solution points are directly above each other, i.e. investments are shared equally
by the high and low ability children. As  declines further the respective leftward and rightward
shift continue, so that investments in the low ability child exceed those in the high ability one.
With the above model in the background it is useful to formally dene compensating and
reinforcing behaviour, before going on to summarise the models empirical predictions.
Denition
Parents are said to reinforce for endowment di¤erences if the marginal e¤ect of a rise in own
ability is bigger for own investment than it is for siblings investment: @hj
@j
  @hk
@j
> 0. Further, if
@hj
@j
> 0 and @hk
@j
= 0 then investments are said to be fully e¢ cient.
Conversely, parents are said to compensate for endowment di¤erences if the marginal e¤ect of a
rise in own ability on own investment is equal to or smaller than the e¤ect on siblings investment:
@hj
@j
  @hk
@j
 0.
The analysis above shows that rich households, who are not credit constrained, will invest in
each of their children until it is no longer protable. Any inequalities in education, and hence
wage earnings, which arise as a consequence of this investment strategy are smoothed out by higher
transfers to those who receive relatively low investments. Credit constrained poorfamilies, on
the other hand, will devote all their resources to education investment, with none left over for
transfers, assuming that at these relatively low levels of human capital investment returns remain
high. In this sense education investment may be considered a necessity and transfers a luxury. How
poor households allocate their investment expenditure will depend on their aversion to inequality.
For rich households, although aversion to inequality inuences transfers, it does not enter into the
education investment decision.
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3 Empirical Strategy
In order to identify reinforcing and compensating behaviour, the following linearised, two-sibling
version of the education investment relationship (equation 4) can be estimated:
hij = Xij1 +Xi2 + 1Aij + 2Aik + uij (6)
where hij is family is investment in child j; Xij and Xi are a detailed set of family and child-
specic covariates, such as parentseducation and income, own sex and birth order; Aij is the
childs own ability and Aik is sibling js ability or IQ, measured by the Ravens test instrument.
uij consists of all unobserved factors a¤ecting outcome hij. A variety of outcomes are considered in
the empirical section, including the highest grade attained (the traditional measure of schooling),
the age at which the individual quit school and whether the child participated in income generating
work during elementary school.
The parameters of interest here are the causal e¤ects of own and sibling ability on hij. Under
the zero conditional mean assumption, E(uij j Xij; Xi; Aij; Aik) = 0, these are identied: ordinary
least square estimation of equation (6) delivers consistent estimates of 1 and 2. A concern here
is that uij and Aij (as well as uij and Aik) are correlated, and so OLS estimates of 1 and 2
are biased. This will be the case if unobserved family characteristics driving schooling outcomes
are also correlated with ability. For example, if higher ability parents, producing higher ability
children, also happen to be richer, have better access to funds for education or inculcate a greater
desire for education, thereby reducing psychic costs of studying, then these other factors may be
driving education outcomes, rather than the childs ability per se. In this case it is important to
take account of such unobserved family background factors.
A potential solution is o¤ered if the error term can be decomposed into a family component
and a white noise component, so that uij = fi + vij. Here fi captures unobserved time-invariant
family factors and it is assumed that E(vij j Xij; Xi; Aij; Aik; fi) = 0. Under this setup, taking
di¤erences across siblings and rearranging terms delivers the following model:
hij   hik = (Xij  Xik)1 + (1   2)(Aij   Aik) + (vij   vik). (7)
So now although 1 and 2 are not individually identied in the xed e¤ect model, we can
determine 1 2. Focusing on @hij@Aij  
@hik
@Aij
, the di¤erence in the marginal e¤ects of own ability on
own and sibling investments, reinforcing and compensating behaviour is dened as follows: parents
are said to reinforce when 1   2 > 0 and compensate when 1   2 < 0. Alternatively, this
denition states that a marginal increase in the gap in childrens endowments leads to a change in
the gap in education outcomes favouring the more (less, respectively) able child when 1 2 > 0
(1 2 < 0, respectively) and parental investments reinforce (compensate, respectively) for sibling
di¤erences.
So far the discussion has focused on the two siblings case, but in practice there may be three
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or more siblings in the estimation sample. When there are n (> 2) siblings in total, model (6)
may be generalised for sibling k as follows:
hik = 1Aik + 2(Ai1 + :::+ Aik 1 + Aik+1 + :::+ Ain) + uik (8)
where the Xs have been dropped to simplify the notation. This equation states that investment
depends on own ability and on the sum of all siblingsabilities; the restriction here is that siblings
abilities are given equal weight, so that children are treated symmetrically. The within family
deviations version of the model is as follows:14
hik   hi: = (1   2)(Aik   Ai:) + vik   vi:. (9)
Thus, the coe¢ cient on Aik in a xed e¤ect regression of hik on Aik will yield an estimate of
1   2. As before, parents reinforce when 1   2 > 0 and compensate when 1   2 < 0.
Econometric Concerns
There are a number of potential objections to the strategy outlined above. First, the measure
of ability, the Ravens test score, may be contaminated by schooling. In this case estimates for
1   2 may be upward biased. This suggests that condence in claims of reinforcing behaviour
on the basis of large, positive estimates for 1  2 may be justiably weak. If on the other hand,
estimates are close to zero or negative then, given the possible upward bias, there may be greater
justication in claiming that this evidence supports the compensating behaviour hypothesis.
A second concern is that if ability is measured with error then the within family estimates will
be subject to potentially large attenuation biases (on the assumption that measurement error is
classical). As will be seen in the estimates presented below, the within estimates are frequently
larger, in absolute terms, than the pooled OLS estimates of equation (6) under the restriction
2 = 0, suggesting that measurement error may not be a rst order concern. (This is the case for
some of the estimates for samples stratied by household income, as well as for estimates of the
health consequences of child labour.)
Finally, many of the outcomes are discrete and so discrete choice models may be preferred to
the linear probability model adopted above.
4 Data and Initial Evidence
4.1 The Mexican Family Life Survey and Sample Selection
The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) is a nationally representative household survey, cover-
ing over 8,400 households in 150 communities across the whole of Mexico. The survey, undertaken
14To see this, note that hik hi: = 1(Aik Ai:)+2[Ai1+ :::+Aik 1+Aik+1+ :::+Ain  (n 1)Ai:]+uik ui:
= 1(Aik  Ai:) + 2[nAi:  Aik   (n  1)Ai:] + uik   ui:
10
in 2002, brings together extremely detailed information on a wide range of social, economic, demo-
graphic and health behaviour of individuals and their families. Each member aged 15 and above
is interviewed and, importantly for this study, provides information on current and retrospective
schooling and employment. A detailed health instrument is also administered, as well as the
Ravens Progressive Matrices test. For further details see Rubalcava and Teruel (2004).
In order to implement the sibling-based xed e¤ect models described in the previous section,
information is required for multiple siblings on completed schooling outcomes (such as nal grade
attainment) and whether the individual participated in income generating work during childhood.
For these reasons sample selection is on children aged 15 to 30 still residing in the household, and
on households where there are at least two such children.15
Table 1 summarises the data for three sets of sub-samples employed in the empirical analysis.
The rst three columns report summary statistics for children aged 15 to 30 from households
where there are at least two children in this age range residing in the household; the next three
columns report statistics for children aged 15 to 30 who have quit school from households where
there are at least two such children; the nal three columns report statistics for male children
aged 15 to 30 from households where there are at least two brothers in this age range. The rst
two sub-samples are used in the analysis on the role of ability in schooling. The last sub-sample
is employed in the analysis on the health e¤ects of child labour.16
The Ravens test score is standardised so that the mean is zero and variance unity within
each year cohort for all individuals in the survey aged 15 to 21 and for the group aged 22 to
30. The summary statistics suggest that the sample selection rules generate sub-samples fairly
representative of the population surveyed in the MxFLS: test scores range between 10% of a
standard deviation below (column 5) and 9% of a standard deviation above (column 2) the survey
average.
For the analysis of the e¤ect of within family variation in ability on schooling and child labour
outcomes, six outcomes, reported in Table 1, are considered: the highest grade attained; whether
or not an elementary grade was repeated; age of enrolment into elementary school; age quit
school; whether or not attended secondary school; and whether or not participated in income
generating work during elementary school. Arguably a measure such as age of quitting school
better captures parental investments than nal grade attainment since the latter captures both
parental investments and ability even if parents invest equally in high and low ability children.17
Child labourin this study refers to whether the individual worked or developed an activity to
help with household expenditure whilst attending elementary school. I use the terms child labour
15Such a wide age range is used to increase the sample size. It might be argued that children up to the age of
30 still residing with their parents are not a representative sample and so this selection rule may lead to biased
results. In order to address this crticism, in the empirical analysis I also report results for the sample of siblings
age 15 to 21.
16The reason for this last selection rule is that boys are much more likley than girls to be engaged in income
generating work at a young age.
17For example, if parents use a rule such that each child quits at the same age and also treat children equally
on other dimensions such as time use, the higher ability child will still have higher attainment becuase he or she is
likley to repeat a grade.
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and income generating work during elementary schoolinterchangeably. It should be noted that
one limitation of the data is that information on work during childhood is available only for this
variety of child labour. Non-market work, such as in household production, may also have long-
term consequences on health. In addition, the exact nature of the income generating work during
childhood is not reported.
The table also reports summary statistics for the seven health related outcomes used for the
analysis on the long-term e¤ects of child labour: whether the individual was ill in the last four
weeks, coded 0 or 1; whether the individual su¤ers from one of seven acute morbidity conditions,
coded 0 or 1; a rating, from 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad), of own health; rating of relative health,
where 1 indicates that own health is much better than others and 5 indicates that it is much worse
than others; whether the individual has had serious health problems during their life; an emotional
wellbeing variable which is the mean response to 21 questions where a response of 0 represents
never feeling sad, pessimistic, insecure, losing appetite, etc. in the last four weeks and 3 represents
always feeling this way; nally, height, standardised to have mean zero and unit variance within
each year-sex cohort for ages 15 to 21 and by sex for 22 to 30 year olds. Further details on exact
denitions are provided in Appendix A.
4.2 Di¤erences in Mean Outcomes For Sibling Pairs
This section presents simple statistics on the di¤erences in various outcomes for high versus low
ability siblings, providing some preliminary evidence on the reinforcing-compensating issue. The
focus is on sibling pairs - this yields simple pairwise comparisons and so the gain in transparency
relative to an analysis using multiple siblings ought to be worth the tradeo¤ in terms of the fall
in the sample size (the regression results in the sub-section below employ the full sample).
Panel A in Table 2 presents for each outcome y, the mean value of the following family level
di¤erences: yhigh ability child  ylow ability child. The results show that the average high-low ability gap
in test scores is 0.88 of a standard deviation. This may seem very large but is in line with ndings
in the psychology literature. For example, Jensen (1982) notes that in the United Sates the gap
in IQ test scores between siblings is 0.8 of a standard deviation. Panel A also shows that this test
score di¤erence is associated with a 7 percentage point lower probability of repeating elementary
grade for the higher ability child and a gap of 0.35 of a grade in attainment. For other outcomes
the mean di¤erence does not appear to be statistically signicant.
Panel B provides further evidence on this issue by stratifying the sample by education of the
head. The mean of the di¤erence between siblings in IQ test scores are broadly similar across
the three types of household. The results for households where the head has no education show
large and signicant di¤erences between the more and less able siblings for two key outcomes:
the higher ability sibling attains a higher level of schooling (0.83 of a grade) and attends school
for longer (0.67 of a year). In contrast, for less poor and richer households (head has primary or
secondary schooling) the di¤erences in attainment and quit age between the more and less able
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child are much smaller and insignicant.
These initial ndings suggest that, large average di¤erences in ability within households do not
translate into higher attainment for the high ability child, except in the poorest families. In other
words, most parents appear to be acting in a compensating manner. In the poorest households
there does appear to be a positive relationship between within family ability di¤erences and
schooling outcomes.
5 Evidence on Parental Preferences: Ability Endowments
and Schooling Outcomes
Before presenting the main ndings in the next section, a useful starting point is the school and
work participation model common in the literature, presented in Table 3. This reports pooled
OLS estimates of equation (8) with the restriction that the coe¢ cient on siblingsability, 2, is
zero. As before, the outcomes are: the highest grade attained; the total number of years in school;
whether or not the child undertook paid work whilst in elementary school; age at which the child
enrolled into elementary school; age at which the child quit school; and whether or not the child
attended secondary school. The sample consists of children aged 15-30 who have quit school from
households where there are at least two such children.
The basic regressions in column (1) for each outcome exclude parental education and IQ test
scores. The rst result of note is that for each of these regressions the coe¢ cients on the Ravens
test score are statistically signicant and economically meaningful, except in the paid work par-
ticipation equation. These cross section results suggest that a one standard deviation rise in the
test score is associated with: 0.62 of a grade higher attainment; a 9 percentage point reduction in
the probability of repeating an elementary grade; 0.35 extra years in school; and a 9 percentage
point rise in the probability of attending secondary school.
There may be countervailing forces at play in the paid work equation. If parents are forced
to send a child out to work it may make sense to send the brighter one in order to maximise
earnings. On the other hand, the human capital investment model, described above, suggests that
the optimal strategy is to keep the brightest children in school.
Parental education dummies are added as controls in column (2) of Table 3 for each outcome.
As expected, these generally have very large e¤ects on outcomes: head education is important
in nearly all of the outcomes whilst the impact of spouse education appears to be strong in
the grade repetition and paid work equations, although these latter estimates are quite noisy.18
Despite these strong e¤ects, adding parental education dummies leads to relatively small declines
in the absolute size of the test score coe¢ cient estimates, suggesting that test scores do not simply
capture unobserved family background characteristics. Adding head and spouse test scores, as well
as parental education dummies in column (3) leads to a decline in the own test score coe¢ cient
18Compare with previous ndings - e.g. Attanasio et al (2006)..
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estimates of 10 to 20 per cent, relative to the estimates in column (1).
5.1 Basic Results
Table 4 presents pooled OLS (panel A) and family xed e¤ect (panel B) estimates of the impact
of the Ravens IQ test score on schooling and child labour participation outcomes. The pooled
regressions estimate the own ability coe¢ cient 1 for the restricted version (2 = 0) of equation
(8). Meanwhile, the within family regression recovers 1 2, the parameter describing reinforcing
or compensating behaviour (see equation 9).19 If the restriction 2 = 0 holds, then the within
family estimator yields 1, as is usually assumed in sibling-based xed e¤ect models.
The pooled estimates in Table 4 tend to suggest that across the population, parents reinforce
for ability. Thus, higher IQ of one standard deviation leads to higher attainment of 0.72 of a grade
and a rise in the school quit age of 0.53 of a year.
The within estimates in panel B of Table 4 suggest that reinforcement is quite mild. For
example, the point estimate suggests that a one standard deviation relative rise in own test score
leads to higher attainment of 0.37 of a grade relative to siblings. This is quite modest when
compared to the average level of attainment for this population (just over eight grades). Similar
e¤ects are obtained for schooling outcomes such as age quit school and the probability of attending
secondary school. Although it is estimated with large error, the within family estimates also
suggest a modest negative e¤ect of ability on the childhood work participation outcome.
The pooled estimates are likely upward biased due to unobserved family-level heterogeneity,
whilst the within estimates may be subject to downward bias if measurement error in ability
is a signicant issue. The true estimates may lie somewhere in between the two sets of results.
Furthermore, both sets of results may be subject to upward bias if the IQ measure is contaminated
by schooling. Overall, the message from Table 4 appears to be that large within family variation
in IQ leads to relatively small di¤erences in attainment: if parents do reinforce for endowment
di¤erences amongst their o¤spring, such reinforcing behaviour is fairly modest.
The Ability-Schooling Relationship by Family Income
Table 5 reports pooled estimates without (panel A) and with (panel B) siblingstest scores,
as well as within family estimates (panel C), both for the full sample as well as for the sample
stratied by education of the head. In the discussion below education of the head is adopted as
a marker of the households permanent income - the rst group, where the household is headed
by a parent with no education, is referred to as the poorest group and the third group, with head
schooled to secondary or higher level, is referred to as the wealthiest set of households.
The results in Table 5 show stark variation in the role of IQ in determining outcomes across the
di¤erent household types. For example, for the age quit school outcome the within estimates in
19The pooled regressions control for own age, gender, whether sibling is oldest, family characteristics such as
parentseducation and IQ test scores, as well as community dummies. The within family regressions include female,
sibling is oldest and age dummies as controls.
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panel C show that for the households where the head has secondary schooling or more, the impact
of ability is very small and statistically insignicant, suggesting compensating behaviour. For the
poorest households, on the other hand, own ability has a positive e¤ect on the age at which the
individual quits school.20 For these households the within estimate of 0.487 years is comparable
to the pooled estimate in panel A of 0.610 years. This last result suggests that the small within
estimates for the wealthiest set of households is not simply driven by measurement error.
Similar patterns across the di¤erent types of households are observed for the probability of
attending secondary school. On the other hand, the pattern is reversed for elementary grade
repetition; but this result for the richer set of households does establish that relative ability
clearly matters for some outcomes in this set of families.21 For the outcome which encapsulates
all of these measures, highest grade attained, it is clear that there is greater compensation (less
reinforcement) for endowment di¤erences in the richer households than in the poorer ones.
Griliches (1979) is the only other study I am aware of which carries out an analysis similar
to the one undertaken here. His analysis is limited to the outcome years of attainment and he
does not report whether the coe¢ cients change with family characteristics. He nds that in the
pooled sample of sibling pairs the impact of a one standard deviation rise in IQ raises schooling by
between 1 and 1.6 years, depending on the data set used.22 The within estimates suggest a much
smaller association: between 0.4 and 0.9 years. Griliches (p.S62) states that: "The fact that the
within-families coe¢ cient is lower I interpret as evidence of attenuation. Families do not go all
the way with the IQ di¤erences among their children as far as their investment in human capital
decisions is concerned." He also speculates (p.S62): "I would expect that within-family variance
in socioeconomic achievement would decline at higher income levels." This is not borne out by the
Mexican evidence presented here, at least as far as siblingsschooling attainment is concerned.
One other piece of evidence comes from Altonji and Dunn (1996). They nd that higher IQ is
not associated with higher quality of schooling within families in the US.
5.2 Robustness Tests
Ideally the data set for this study would include test scores and schooling information for all
children, whether they reside in the household or not. Although such data will eventually be
available with the second and third waves of the Mexican Family Life Survey, until that time
sample selection rules such as the one employed above (restricting estimates to those households
20One might ask whether there is any evidence that the poorest parents invest so as to maximise returns. In
order to answer such questions we may turn to the pooled regression estimates for 1 and 2 in model (8), reported
in panel B of Table 4. The theoretical discussion above showed that parental preferences may be e¢ cient when the
marginal e¤ect of a rise in own ability on own investment is positive and the e¤ect is zero for sibling investment,
i.e. 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. Panel B provides estimates for 1 > 0 and 2, but the rider is that the coe¢ cinet on
siblingsability, 2, may in fact capture the family xed e¤ect, as in Chamberlains (1982) formulation of xed
e¤ects model. The results in panel B suggest that the e¤ect of a rise in own ability on own investment is positive,
but the e¤ect on siblingsinvestment is small and statistically insignicant from zero.
21The various schooling outcomes may be combined in a dynamic analysis - to be condsidered for future work -
such as the Markov schooling transition model employed by Behrman et al (2005).
22Griliches (1979) employs three sibling pairs and two twins data sets, all from the US.
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where there are at least two children residing in the household within a given age range) are
necessary in order to perform within family estimations. In order to obtain a relatively large
sample size a wide age range (15 to 30) is used in the preceding analysis. A possible criticism of
this sample selection strategy is that children up to the age of 30 still residing with their parents
are not necessarily representative of the population. Furthermore, if parents treat boys and girls
di¤erently on margins other than ability, then mixed sex siblings may not provide a good testing
ground for reinforcing and compensating mechanisms.
In order to probe the robustness of the above results to these two issues, this sub-section
reports results using alternative sample selection rules. The rst experiment is to narrow the age
range and select children where there are at least two children between the ages of 15 and 21
who have quit school from households where there are at least two such children. The results in
Appendix Table A1 suggest that the previous results are qualitatively unchanged under the new
sample. Indeed, the conclusion that richer parents compensate to a greater degree than poorer
ones now appears to be even stronger: the pooled coe¢ cient estimates for the IQ test score for the
grade attainment outcome for the poorest and richest households are 0.82 and 0.21 respectively;
the within estimates are 0.39 and -0.11 (the estimates are now much noisier due to the reduced
sample size).
Table A2 reports estimates for the brothers only and sisters only samples (the age range is 15
to 30). The sample size is now much diminished, but it is clear from the results that estimates for
brothers and sisters are broadly similar.
6 Evidence on Inequalities Arising From Within Family
Variation in Child Labour Participation
The results in the previous section suggest that the tendency amongst parents to reinforce for
endowment di¤erences amongst their children is not strong. But still, inequalities in parental
allocations will remain. In particular, there are substantial inequalities within the family on
the child labour participation margin. For example, in the brothers sample used below, of the
families where at least one brother worked as a child, in 80% of cases there is some variation
within the family on this margin.23 Even though parents may be averse to inequalities between
their children, these inequalities may nevertheless be a natural by-product of, for example, xed
costs in the child labour participation decision. Parents may then be forced to pick and choose
amongst their young children for child labour. The question then is do these di¤erences in labour
participation matter in the long run? If parents can take compensating action then it may be that
any adverse consequences of working as a child are mitigated.
The evidence below suggests that there are large negative long-term health consequences for
23For this sample, in 4% of families all brothers worked to generate income for the household during elementary
school; in 18% of families at least one brother worked whilst a second brother did not; and in the remaing 78% of
families, none of the brothers worked.
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the working child. Even if most parents are acting in a compensating manner along the IQ or
ability dimension they are unable to undo the harmful e¤ects of one of their children working in
an income generating activity at a young age.
Using the retrospective question asked of all individuals of fteen and above on whether they
participated in an income generating activity during elementary school, this section investigates
the long-term e¤ects (at ages 15 to 30) of this type of work on health outcomes.24 It also considers
the association between child labour and schooling.
The strategy once again relies on sibling methods, this time to control for time-invariant
unobserved family characteristics which may be correlated with the child labour decision. Before
proceeding further, it should be noted that the sample selection for the analysis below is male
siblings, since young daughters are much less likely to undertake paid work than sons.25 Thus, in
the within family estimates, the comparison is between brothers who participated in paid work
during their childhood and those who did not.
6.1 The Long-Term E¤ects of Child Labour on Health Outcomes
For the brothers aged 15 to 30 sample, Table 6 reports pooled and within family estimates of the
e¤ect of undertaking income generating work during childhood for seven current health-related
outcomes: whether the individual was ill in the last four weeks; whether the individual su¤ers
from an acute morbidity condition; rating of own health; health relative to others; whether the
individual has had serious health problems during their life; an emotional wellbeing variable; and
height, standardised to have mean zero and unit variance. Further details of these variables are
provided in Appendix A.
The rst two measures may be considered hardmeasures of health, since they ask about
specic illnesses and conditions, whilst the remaining four (excluding height) are softmeasures
since they are more subjective and there may be concerns about anchoring for these measures.
The key nding in Table 6 is apparent from each of the rst columns of the within family
regressions for acute morbidity and ill last four weeks: the coe¢ cients for participation in
income generating work in both cases are large and statistically signicant. These suggest that
child labour leads to an 8.3 percentage point greater likelihood of having one of seven acute
morbidity conditions and a 16.0 percentage point greater likelihood of having had one of fteen
illnesses in the recent past. These represent rises of 93 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively,
relative to the means for these two outcomes reported in the last three columns of Table 1.
Comparing the pooled and within family estimates for acute morbidity reveals the importance of
controlling for unobserved family characteristics: the within estimate is over twice as large as the
pooled estimate.
24As noted earlier, the Mexican Family Life Survey only collects this type of child work for individuals aged 15
and above.
25Only 4% of daughters aged 15-30 in the household undertook such work whilst the number is 11% for sons.
The results for females (not reported) are in fact qualitatively similar to those for males, though the parameters
are estimated with greater noise.
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For the four subjective health measures, the coe¢ cient on paid work is statistically signicant
in only one case: the sibling who undertook income generating work during elementary school
scores worse on emotional wellbeing. For height, the within estimates, though noisy, suggest that
siblings who worked during their childhood are about 5 per cent of a standard deviation taller in
adolescence and adulthood than those who did not. Given the negative e¤ects of health suggested
by the other health outcomes, one explanation for this nding is that at the time the decision is
made, parents select their healthier or tter children for child labour.26
One econometric concern is that although the common family-level characteristics are con-
trolled for in the within family regressions, the possibility remains that omitted individual factors
correlated with child labour participation may in fact be driving the estimated e¤ects on health
outcomes. In order to account for some of this individual-level heterogeneity the regressions in
the second column for each outcome in Table 6 include individual IQ test scores. The results in
the previous section suggested that there is some, perhaps weak, relationship between ability and
participation in child labour. If ability also determines health, then omitting it from the within
family regressions may lead to upward biased estimates of the impact of child labour. In fact the
results in Table 6 suggest that there is little change in the estimates of the impact of child work
on health when ability is taken into account.
A further, and arguably more important, test of the importance of within family heterogeneity
is provided by including controls in the regressions for the individuals occupational status and
sector of employment. Apart from incorporating the e¤ects of current work, these should also
capture less easily measured factors such as greater parental care for one child over another,
assuming these also determine adult labour market outcomes. The results are shown in the
third and nal column for each outcome in Table 6. These regressions now include eight current
occupational status dummies as well as dummies for Mexican industrial classication codes for
the individuals sector of employment. The work status dummies include whether the individual
is in employment, whether he or she is a student and whether he or she is currently too sick to
work. The results in Table 6 show that the previous conclusions are robust to the inclusion of
these variables. Indeed, for the acute morbidity outcome, the coe¢ cient on income generating
work during childhood rises by over 10 per cent.
Further Robustness Tests
Table A3 in the Appendix reports estimates for the narrower age range of 15 to 21 year old
brothers. Due to the lower cut-o¤ point for age, the sample size is now halved and the standard
errors are larger. The within family estimates for the coe¢ cient on income generating work during
childhood, both for the ill last four weeksand acute morbidityoutcomes, appear to be in line
with those reported in Table 6, although the former is now measured with substantially bigger
26Stratifying the sample by education of the head (results are not reported) suggests that there may be an upward
gradient with respect to heads education in the adverse e¤ects of child labour, though due to the small sample
size, none of the coe¢ cients are statistically di¤erent from zero.
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error. For the other four health outcomes, child work appears to lead to worse health outcomes,
but these estimates are not statistically signicant. Overall, the results do not appear to be
sensitive to the age at which the cut-o¤ point is set for the sample selection rule.27
6.2 Child Labour and Education
The next set of results report estimates from regressions of education outcomes on child labour
participation. Unlike the analysis of the e¤ects on health outcomes, this exercise does not provide
causal evidence on the e¤ects of child labour, but rather it is a descriptive exercise which sheds light
on the association between child labour and schooling.28 Put another way, the question answered
here is: What is the schooling outcome conditional on the individual participating in income
generating work during childhood? As will be shown, the family xed e¤ect model once again
proves itself useful in uncovering estimates substantially di¤erent from those where family-level
unobserved heterogeneity is not accounted for.
Table 7 shows pooled and within family estimates for ve schooling outcomes for the sample of
brothers aged 15 to 30, where the brothers have all quit school. Though the child labour coe¢ cients
are estimated with large error, perhaps due to the small sample size, the results in Table 7 appear
to tell a consistent story across the various schooling outcomes: rst, participation in income
generating work as a child is associated with relatively large (when compared with the e¤ect of IQ
test scores) losses in schooling; and second, it is important to take into account unobserved time
invariant family characteristics for three of the ve outcomes (attainment, age quit school and
whether or not the individual attended secondary school) the association is substantially larger
for the within estimates than for the pooled estimates.
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of parental investment in children of varying ability. The model
stresses the di¤erent tradeo¤s faced by credit constrained and non-credit constrained households.
The model predicts that richer parents can invest e¢ ciently and o¤set inequalities in childrens
adult incomes via transfers. If poorer parents invest e¢ ciently then the resulting income inequali-
ties between children cannot be o¤set since parental transfers are limited or non-existent. Thus, if
parents are averse to inequality amongst their children then poorer households will allocate more
resources to the less able child, trading o¤ some e¢ ciency for greater equity. This simple model
predicts that the ability-investment association is stronger in better o¤ households, i.e. richer
households probably reinforce more (and certainly no less) than poorer households.29
27Qualitatively similar results are obtained when the cut-o¤ age is set to 18, although this time the standard
errors are even larger.
28More so than adult health and child labour, schooling and child labour decisions are likely to be jointly
determined.
29Another interpreation of this result is that rich parents are able to full their childrens full potential, whilst
the lack of opportunity limits able children in poorer households.
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These predictions are tested using Mexican household data. Using IQ test score measures as
a direct measure of individualsendowments, I nd that even though there appear to be large
di¤erences in ability between siblings, these do not lead to large di¤erences in schooling. There
is no evidence of strong reinforcing behaviour. Furthermore, richer parents appear to engage in
greater compensating behaviour than poorer ones.
I then investigate whether the large observed variation in child labour participation leads to
any signicant adverse e¤ects for the sibling who works. If parents take compensating action,
then it may be that any adverse e¤ects are mitigated. More specically, the question addressed
is: What is the long-term health e¤ect of participating in income generating work at a young
age? The results show that there are large negative e¤ects on health. Taken together, these
results suggest that even though parents may compensate for endowment di¤erences along some
dimensions, at the end of the day they nay be forced to pick and choose amongst their o¤spring
for some allocations, leading to large inequalities.
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Appendix A: Denitions of Health and Child Labour Variables
Ill last four weeksis a zero one dummy, coded one if the individual reports having any one of
the following 15 conditions in the last four weeks: u; cough; di¢ culty breathing; stomach ache;
nausea or vomited; diarrhea; swollen joints; rash; irritated eyes; tooth ache; headache; fever; body
ache; chest pain; and awoke with headaches.
Acute morbidityis a zero one dummy, coded one if the individual has any one of the following
conditions: diabetes; hypertension; heart disease; cancer; rheumatoid arthiritis; gastric ulcer;
migraine; or another, self-reported chronic illness.
Rate own healthis the response to the question Currently, would you say that you health is
. . . ?Options run from 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad).
Relative health is the response to the question: If you compare yourself with people the
same age and gender, would you say your health is . . . ?Options vary between 1 (Much better
than others) to 5 (Much worse than others).
Had serious health problems-is a zero one dummy, coded one if the response is Yes to the
question: Have you ever had any serious health problems during your life?
Emotional wellbeingis the mean response to 21 questions where a response of 0 represents
never feeling sad, pessimistic, insecure, losing appetite, etc. in the last four weeks and 3 represents
always feeling this way.
The variable Income generating work during elementary schoolis a yes / no response to the
question: "Whilst attending elementary school, did you work or develop an activity to help with
household expenditure?"
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Figure 1a: Marginal return to human capital investment: equilibrium 
investments in high and low ability siblings 
 
 
Figure 1b: The effect of increasing rho when credit constraints bind 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Children Aged 15-30, Two or More Siblings Sample 
Observations Mean Standard error Observations Mean Standard error Observations Mean Standard error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Age 2958 19.95 0.071 1389 21.14 0.1046 883 19.99 0.1266
Female 2958 0.503 0.0092 1389 0.478 0.0134 883 0.000 0
   Schooling and work
Currently enroled at school 2958 0.367 0.0089 1389 0.000 0 883 0.302 0.0155
Highest grade attained 2956 9.045 0.0496 1389 8.054 0.0729 883 8.558 0.0915
Repeated elementary grade 2958 0.296 0.0084 1389 0.354 0.0128 883 0.359 0.0162
Age at enrolment 2958 6.18 0.0166 1389 6.26 0.0266 883 6.22 0.0271
Age quit school 1820 15.71 0.0792 1389 15.42 0.0881 617 15.51 0.1315
Ever attended secondary school 2958 0.819 0.0071 1389 0.680 0.0125 883 0.776 0.014
Income generating work during elementary school 2958 0.070 0.0047 1389 0.090 0.0077 883 0.123 0.0111
   Health
Ill last four weeks (= 1 if had one of 15 illnesses) 2934 0.628 0.0089 1381 0.617 0.0131 877 0.580 0.0167
Acute morbidity (= 1 if had one of 7 conditions) 2596 0.121 0.0064 1217 0.116 0.0092 772 0.089 0.0103
Rate own health (1=very good; 5=very bad) 2934 2.277 0.0116 1381 2.368 0.0164 877 2.310 0.021
Relative health (1= Better than others; 5=Worse) 2934 2.627 0.0115 1381 2.657 0.0161 877 2.645 0.0204
Had serious health problems (0 / 1) 2934 0.125 0.0061 1381 0.103 0.0082 877 0.096 0.0099
Emotional wellbeing (0=Never gloomy; 3=Always) 2934 0.280 0.0056 1381 0.281 0.0086 877 0.213 0.0086
   Height, IQ and family background
Height (standardised) 2476 0.054 0.0196 1185 -0.046 0.0293 706 0.044 0.0349
Own Raven's test score (standardised) 2958 0.090 0.0184 1389 -0.100 0.0271 883 0.059 0.0343
Education of head = none 2958 0.146 0.0065 1389 0.199 0.0107 883 0.163 0.0124
Education of head = primary 2958 0.578 0.0091 1389 0.647 0.0128 883 0.605 0.0165
Education of head = secondary 2958 0.197 0.0073 1389 0.141 0.0093 883 0.232 0.0142
Education of head = college 2958 0.078 0.0049 1389 0.013 0.003 883 0.000 0
Education of spouse = none 2424 0.157 0.0074 1128 0.226 0.0125 734 0.183 0.0143
Education of spouse = primary 2424 0.615 0.0099 1128 0.676 0.0139 734 0.644 0.0177
Education of spouse = secondary 2424 0.180 0.0078 1128 0.090 0.0085 734 0.158 0.0135
Education of spouse = college 2424 0.049 0.0044 1128 0.007 0.0025 734 0.015 0.0045
Head standardised Raven's test score 2475 -0.053 0.02 1150 -0.191 0.0283 756 -0.143 0.0359
Spouse standardised Raven's test score 2284 -0.101 0.0198 1078 -0.275 0.0268 695 -0.227 0.0337
No. children in household age 0 to 14 2958 0.938 0.0236 1389 0.952 0.0368 883 1.014 0.0457
No. of households 1225 586 398
2+ children, age 15-30 AND quit school2+ children, age 15-30 Brothers: 2+ male children, age 15-30
 
Note: For columns 1 to 3 selection is on children aged 15-30 from households where there are at least two children in this age range residing in the household. For columns 4 to 6 selection is on 
children aged 15-30 who have quit school from households where there are at least two such children. In columns 7 to 9 selection is on male children aged 15-30 from households where there 
are at least two brothers in this age range. Before performing these selections, and in order to have a consistent sample for later regressions, for columns 1 to 9 observations are dropped if any of 
the following variables are missing: own Raven’s test score, age at enrolment, paid work whilst in elementary school, education of head. In addition, observations for which school quit age is 
missing are also dropped for columns 4 to 6. 
      Table 2: Differences in Outcomes for High and Low Ability Siblings 
Panel A: All Sibling Pairs
Outcome Mean Std. Error
Standardised test score 0.88 0.03
Highest grade attained 0.35 0.14
Repeated elementary grade -0.07 0.03
Age at enrolment -0.07 0.06
Age quit school 0.23 0.19
Attended secondary school 0.03 0.03
Income generating work during elementary school 0.003 0.020
Age 0.15 0.24
Female = 1 -0.02 0.04
(No. sibling pairs = 349)
Panel B: By Education of Head
Outcome Education of head Mean Std. Error
(no. sibling pairs)
Standardised test score None (69) 0.84 0.08
Standardised test score Primary (214) 0.90 0.04
Standardised test score Secondary (66) 0.86 0.08
Highest grade attained None (69) 0.83 0.33
Highest grade attained Primary (214) 0.26 0.17
Highest grade attained Secondary (66) -0.06 0.35
Repeated elementary grade None (69) 0.06 0.08
Repeated elementary grade Primary (214) -0.12 0.04
Repeated elementary grade Secondary (66) -0.11 0.07
Age at enrolment None (69) -0.06 0.13
Age at enrolment Primary (214) -0.13 0.06
Age at enrolment Secondary (66) 0.09 0.19
Age quit school None (69) 0.67 0.43
Age quit school Primary (214) 0.10 0.25
Age quit school Secondary (66) -0.03 0.46
Attended secondary school None (69) 0.10 0.07
Attended secondary school Primary (214) 0.00 0.04
Attended secondary school Secondary (66) 0.00 0.04
Income generating work during elementary school None (69) 0.00 0.05
Income generating work during elementary school Primary (214) -0.01 0.03
Income generating work during elementary school Secondary (66) 0.06 0.04
Age None (69) 0.45 0.59
Age Primary (214) 0.20 0.30
Age Secondary (66) -0.29 0.46
Female = 1 None (69) -0.03 0.08
Female = 1 Primary (214) -0.01 0.05
Female = 1 Secondary (66) -0.05 0.08
 
Note: This table shows the differences in Raven’s test scores and other outcomes for the high versus low ability 
sibling. Sample selection is on children aged 15-30 who have quit school from households where there are exactly 
two such children. Before performing this selection, child observations are dropped if any of the following 
variables are missing: Raven’s test score, age at enrolment, paid work whilst in elementary school, school quit age 
and education of head.  
Table 3: Determinants of Schooling and Child Labour Participation Outcomes 
Regressors
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Test score 0.851 0.769 0.724 -0.099 -0.095 -0.084 -0.103 -0.097 -0.091 0.632 0.544 0.532
(0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.083) (0.083) (0.087)
Female 0.420 0.453 0.447 -0.101 -0.104 -0.099 0.023 0.016 0.018 0.065 0.089 0.088
(0.134) (0.131) (0.131) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) (0.156) (0.154) (0.154)
Sibling is oldest = 1 -0.133 -0.201 -0.224 0.089 0.093 0.096 -0.038 -0.034 -0.024 -0.316 -0.387 -0.413
(0.155) (0.151) (0.154) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.186) (0.181) (0.182)
No. children age 1-14 -0.222 -0.205 -0.212 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 0.027 0.026 0.026 -0.069 -0.060 -0.065
(0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074)
Education of head = primary 0.639 0.635 0.008 0.008 -0.050 -0.058 0.846 0.855
(0.227) (0.231) (0.037) (0.037) (0.072) (0.073) (0.240) (0.242)
Education of head = secondary 1.429 1.385 -0.043 -0.033 -0.024 -0.024 1.772 1.773
(0.269) (0.273) (0.051) (0.051) (0.144) (0.146) (0.295) (0.298)
Education of head = college 2.495 2.288 -0.107 -0.045 -0.245 -0.229 2.611 2.583
(0.458) (0.468) (0.091) (0.090) (0.168) (0.173) (0.660) (0.674)
Education of spouse = primary 0.375 0.339 -0.076 -0.065 -0.229 -0.225 -0.222 -0.249
(0.233) (0.238) (0.041) (0.040) (0.087) (0.085) (0.272) (0.275)
Education of spouse = secondary 0.786 0.727 -0.095 -0.063 -0.350 -0.340 0.104 0.084
(0.344) (0.351) (0.063) (0.062) (0.134) (0.130) (0.390) (0.394)
Education of spouse = college 2.516 2.496 -0.208 -0.191 -0.358 -0.349 2.243 2.222
(0.452) (0.461) (0.136) (0.141) (0.404) (0.394) (0.744) (0.733)
Head test score 0.165 -0.022 -0.027 0.032
(0.092) (0.017) (0.026) (0.110)
Spouse test score 0.020 -0.038 0.016 -0.020
(0.103) (0.018) (0.033) (0.122)
Grade Attainment Age at Enrolment Age Quit SchoolElementary Grade Repetition
 
      (table continues overleaf) 
Table 3 (cont.) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Test score 0.104 0.093 0.086 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Female 0.040 0.046 0.045 -0.113 -0.113 -0.114
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Sibling is oldest = 1 -0.041 -0.050 -0.053 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
No. children age 1-14 -0.054 -0.053 -0.053 0.008 0.009 0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Education of head = primary 0.130 0.130 -0.022 -0.025
(0.040) (0.040) (0.026) (0.026)
Education of head = secondary 0.240 0.233 -0.004 -0.004
(0.044) (0.045) (0.038) (0.038)
Education of head = college 0.225 0.190 -0.002 -0.006
(0.062) (0.066) (0.066) (0.064)
Education of spouse = primary 0.045 0.041 -0.002 -0.008
(0.041) (0.042) (0.028) (0.028)
Education of spouse = secondary 0.080 0.070 -0.053 -0.065
(0.057) (0.059) (0.035) (0.036)
Education of spouse = college 0.086 0.083 -0.089 -0.097
(0.060) (0.062) (0.054) (0.056)
Head test score 0.028 -0.026
(0.016) (0.009)
Spouse test score 0.005 0.033
(0.020) (0.013)
Attended Secondary School during elementary school
Income generating work 
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the family level, in brackets. Each regression also includes age, state and four community size dummies. Missing spouse education dummies are included in 
specifications (2) and (3). Missing head and spouse test scores are set to zero and missing dummies included in specification (3). Raven’s test scores are standardized to have mean zero and unit 
variance. ‘Grade attainment’ refers to highest grade attained; ‘elementary grade repetition’, ‘income generating work during elementary school’ and ‘attended secondary school’ are all binary 
variables. The ‘Sibling is oldest’ dummy is turned on if the child is the eldest of the siblings included in the sample. Sample selection is on children aged 15-30 who have quit school and where 
there are at least two such children residing in the household. Before performing this selection, child observations are dropped if any of the following variables are missing: own test score, age 
at enrolment, paid work whilst in elementary school, education of head and school quit age. Sample size for all five regressions: 1,389.  
 
Table 4: The Impact of Ability on Schooling and Child Labour Participation: Pooled and Within Family Estimates 
(Sample: all children aged 15-30 who have quit school from families with two or more such children) 
 
Income generating work 
Grade Attainment Elementary Grade Repetition Age at Enrolment Age Quit School Attended Secondary School during elementary school
Panel A: 
Pooled Estimates
Test score 0.724 -0.084 -0.091 0.531 0.086 -0.001
(0.070) (0.014) (0.025) (0.087) (0.013) (0.008)
Number of children 1389 1389 1389 1389 1389 1389
Panel B:
Within Family Estimates
Test score 0.371 -0.067 -0.029 0.350 0.033 -0.008
(0.081) (0.019) (0.032) (0.115) (0.018) (0.011)
Number of children 1389 1389 1389 1389 1389 1389
Number of families 586 586 586 586 586 586
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the family level, in brackets. Each regression in Panel A includes female, sibling is oldest dummies, number of children age 0-14 in the household, head and 
spouse education dummies, head and spouse test scores as well as age, state and four community size dummies; missing head and spouse test scores are set to zero and missing dummies 
included; missing spouse education dummies are also included. The within family regression in Panel B include female, sibling is oldest and age dummies. Test scores are standardized to have 
mean zero and unit variance. ‘Grade attainment’ refers to highest grade attained; ‘elementary grade repetition’, ‘attended secondary school’ and ‘Income generating work during elementary 
school’ are all binary variables. Sample selection is as in Table 3.  
 
Table 5: The Impact of Ability on Schooling and Child Labour Participation: Pooled and Within Family Estimates 
Stratified by Household Type 
(Sample: all children aged 15-30 who have quit school from families with two or more such children) 
Full sample None Primary Secondary Full sample None Primary Secondary Full sample None Primary Secondary Full sample None Primary Secondary
and higher and higher and higher and higher
Panel A: Pooled
Test score 0.724 0.856 0.710 0.453 -0.084 -0.034 -0.099 -0.077 -0.091 -0.073 -0.083 -0.179 0.531 0.610 0.492 0.486
(0.070) (0.168) (0.087) (0.186) (0.014) (0.033) (0.017) (0.036) (0.025) (0.065) (0.026) (0.097) (0.087) (0.189) (0.115) (0.227)
Panel B: Pooled
Test score 0.654 0.800 0.648 0.464 -0.082 -0.038 -0.094 -0.076 -0.081 -0.049 -0.080 -0.182 0.500 0.595 0.471 0.501
(0.065) (0.153) (0.083) (0.181) (0.014) (0.035) (0.017) (0.035) (0.024) (0.065) (0.026) (0.099) (0.087) (0.197) (0.113) (0.215)
Siblings' test score 0.225 0.158 0.224 0.361 -0.006 0.012 -0.017 0.036 -0.036 -0.065 -0.011 -0.091 0.099 0.043 0.074 0.469
(0.069) (0.152) (0.080) (0.198) (0.011) (0.024) (0.013) (0.032) (0.019) (0.051) (0.019) (0.114) (0.072) (0.147) (0.091) (0.171)
Panel C:
Within Family Estimates
Test score 0.371 0.402 0.372 0.193 -0.067 -0.028 -0.068 -0.125 -0.029 0.117 -0.069 -0.086 0.350 0.487 0.323 0.085
(0.081) (0.184) (0.101) (0.227) (0.019) (0.052) (0.024) (0.049) (0.032) (0.095) (0.036) (0.087) (0.115) (0.251) (0.144) (0.253)
Number of children 1389 276 899 214 1389 276 899 214 1389 276 899 214 1389 276 899 214
Number of families 586 114 372 100 586 114 372 100 586 114 372 100 586 114 372 100
Elementary Grade Repetition
Head education Head education Head education
Age at Enrolment Age Quit SchoolGrade Attainment
Head education
 
 
 
(table continues overleaf) 
Table 5 (cont.) 
Full sample None Primary Secondary Full sample None Primary Secondary
and higher and higher
Panel A: Pooled
Test score 0.086 0.133 0.076 0.027 -0.001 0.008 -0.006 0.012
(0.013) (0.032) (0.017) (0.035) (0.008) (0.021) (0.010) (0.029)
Panel B: Pooled
Test score 0.072 0.118 0.065 0.028 -0.001 0.015 -0.007 0.013
(0.013) (0.032) (0.017) (0.034) (0.009) (0.022) (0.010) (0.028)
Siblings' test score 0.045 0.041 0.042 0.024 0.000 -0.022 0.004 0.019
(0.011) (0.026) (0.014) (0.027) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.017)
Panel C:
Within Family Estimates
Test score 0.033 0.052 0.031 -0.023 -0.008 0.026 -0.014 -0.017
(0.018) (0.045) (0.022) (0.037) (0.011) (0.029) (0.013) (0.032)
Number of children 1389 276 899 214 1389 276 899 214
Number of families 586 114 372 100 586 114 372 100
Head education
Attended Secondary School
Head education
during elementary school
Income generating work 
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the family level, in brackets. Each regression in Panel A and Panel B includes female, sibling is oldest dummies, number of children age 0-14 in the 
household, head and spouse education dummies, head and spouse test scores, age, state and four community size dummies; missing head and spouse test scores are set to zero and missing 
dummies included; missing spouse education dummies are also included. Regressions in Panel A include own Raven’s test score but not (the sum of) sibling’s test score; regressions in Panel B 
include both. The within family regression in Panel C include female, sibling is oldest and age dummies. Test scores are standardized to have mean zero and unit variance. ‘Grade attainment’ 
refers to highest grade attained; ‘elementary grade repetition’, ‘attended secondary school’ and ‘Income generating work during elementary school’ are all binary variables. Sample selection is 
as in Table 3 
Table 6: The Effect of Child Labour on Long-term Health Outcomes: Pooled and Within Family Estimates 
(Sample: male children – still at school as well as those who have quit school – aged 15-30 from families with two or more brothers in this age range) 
Pooled estimates
Income generating work during 0.138 0.135 0.144 0.038 0.036 0.048 0.169 0.165 0.173 0.122 0.120 0.124
          elementary school (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.062) (0.062) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.069)
Test score -0.032 -0.037 -0.017 -0.025 -0.052 -0.043 -0.023 -0.021
(0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.013) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Occupation and sector controls YES YES YES YES
Within estimates
Income generating work during 0.160 0.163 0.164 0.083 0.079 0.089 0.009 0.005 0.024 0.077 0.074 0.069
          elementary school (0.078) (0.078) (0.082) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.087) (0.088) (0.091) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098)
Test score 0.016 0.019 -0.018 -0.020 -0.022 -0.020 -0.012 -0.008
(0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
Occupation and sector controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 878 878 878 771 771 771 878 878 878 878 878 878
Number of families 396 396 396 347 347 347 396 396 396 396 396 396
(1= Better than others; 5=Worse)
Relative health 
(1=very good; 5=very bad)
Rate own health Ill last four weeks 
 (= 1 if had one of 7 conditions)
Acute morbidity
(=1 had if one of 15 illnesses)
 
 
(table continues overleaf) 
Table 6 (cont.) 
 
Pooled estimates
Income generating work during 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.134 0.132 0.135 0.027 0.031 0.005
          elementary school (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.106) (0.104) (0.107)
Test score -0.005 -0.011 -0.025 -0.029 0.096 0.085
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.038) (0.040)
Occupation and sector controls YES YES YES
Within estimates
Income generating work during 0.004 0.004 -0.005 0.103 0.102 0.089 0.053 0.056 0.027
          elementary school (0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.108) (0.108) (0.114)
Test score -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 -0.013 0.013 0.007
(0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.036) (0.041)
Occupation and sector controls YES YES YES
Observations 878 878 878 878 878 878 655 655 655
Number of families 396 396 396 396 396 396 298 298 298
 (standardised)
Height
(0=Never gloomy; 3=Always)
Emotional wellbeing 
 (yes / no)
Had serious health problems
 
Note: For each of the seven health outcomes this table shows results from three regressions each for the pooled and within family estimates. The first set of regressions, reported in the first 
column for each outcome, exclude test scores and the adult/adolescent’s occupation and sector of employment dummies; the second regression adds test scores; the third regression adds test 
scores as well as occupation and sector dummies. Standard errors, clustered at the family level, in brackets. The pooled estimates include sibling is oldest dummy, number of children age 0-14 
in the household, head and spouse education dummies, head and spouse test scores, age, state and four community size dummies; missing head and spouse test scores are set to zero and missing 
dummies included; missing spouse education dummies are also included. The within family regressions includes age and sibling is oldest dummies. Test scores are standardized to have mean 
zero and unit variance. For definitions of the health outcomes, see Appendix A. See notes to columns 7 to 9 in Table 1 for full details on the sample selection.  
Table 7: Child Labour and Education Outcomes: Pooled and Within Family Estimates 
(Sample: male children aged 15-30 who have quit school  from families with two or more such children) 
 
Pooled estimates
Income generating work during -0.19 -0.27 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.03 -0.01 -0.02
          elementary school (0.37) (0.35) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15) (0.15) (0.37) (0.36) (0.07) (0.06)
Test score 0.63 -0.10 -0.08 0.47 0.11
(0.12) (0.02) (0.04) (0.15) (0.02)
Within estimates
Income generating work during -0.56 -0.54 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.16 -0.31 -0.28 -0.11 -0.11
          elementary school (0.36) (0.35) (0.09) (0.09) (0.22) (0.21) (0.51) (0.52) (0.08) (0.08)
Test score 0.28 -0.08 -0.11 0.38 0.06
(0.11) (0.03) (0.05) (0.20) (0.03)
Observations 478 478 478 478 478 478 478 478 478 478
Number of families 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216
Age at Enrolment Age Quit School Attended Secondary SchoolGrade Attainment Elementary Grade Repetition
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the family level, in brackets. The pooled estimates include sibling is oldest dummy, number of children age 0-14 in the household, head and spouse education 
dummies, head and spouse test scores, age, state and four community size dummies; missing head and spouse test scores are set to zero and missing dummies included; missing spouse education 
dummies are also included. The within family regressions includes age and sibling is oldest dummies. Test scores are standardized to have mean zero and unit variance. All females are dropped 
before performing the sample selection as in Table 3.  
 
Appendix Table A1: The Impact of Ability on Schooling and Child Labour Participation 
Sensitivity Analaysis: Age 15-21 Sample 
(All children aged 15-21 who have quit school from families with two or more such children) 
Full sample None Primary Secondary Full sample None Primary Secondary Full sample None Primary Secondary Full sample None Primary Secondary
and higher and higher and higher and higher
Panel A: OLS
Test score 0.50 0.82 0.42 0.21 -0.09 -0.01 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09 -0.05 -0.11 -0.09 0.15 0.78 -0.03 -0.17
(0.11) (0.19) (0.16) (0.37) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.12) (0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.27) (0.15) (0.30)
Panel B: OLS
Test score 0.46 0.84 0.38 0.41 -0.09 -0.01 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.11 -0.14 0.14 0.77 -0.07 -0.09
(0.11) (0.16) (0.15) (0.35) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) (0.27) (0.15) (0.30)
Siblings' test score 0.27 0.41 0.27 0.50 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.29 0.03 -0.11 0.09 -0.19 0.19 0.18
(0.09) (0.16) (0.12) (0.34) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) (0.24) (0.13) (0.25)
Panel C:
Within Family Estimates
Test score 0.19 0.39 0.17 -0.11 -0.084 0.002 -0.090 -0.193 -0.03 0.23 -0.15 -0.01 0.16 0.98 -0.10 -0.33
(0.13) (0.23) (0.17) (0.35) (0.032) (0.075) (0.040) (0.067) (0.05) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.29) (0.20) (0.27)
Number of children 593 126 370 97 593 126 370 97 593 126 370 97 593 126 370 97
Number of families 270 57 166 47 270 57 166 47 270 57 166 47 270 57 166 47
Grade Attainment
Head education
Elementary Grade Repetition
Head education Head education Head education
Age at Enrolment Age Quit School
 
 
 
(table continues overleaf) 
Table A1 (cont.) 
Full sample None Primary Secondary Full sample None Primary Secondary
and higher and higher
Panel A: OLS
Test score 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Panel B: OLS
Test score 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Siblings' test score 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Panel C:
Within Family Estimates
Test score 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Number of children 593 126 370 97 593 126 370 97
Number of families 270 57 166 47 270 57 166 47
Head education
Attended Secondary School
Head education
Paid Work Whilst at Elementary School
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the family level, in brackets. Each regression in Panel A and Panel B includes female, sibling is oldest dummies, number of children age 0-14 in the 
household, head and spouse education dummies, head and spouse test scores, age, state and four community size dummies; missing head and spouse test scores are set to zero and missing 
dummies included; missing spouse education dummies are also included. Regressions in Panel A include own Raven’s test score but not (the sum of) sibling’s test score; regressions in Panel B 
include both. The within family regression in Panel C includes age, female and sibling is oldest dummies. Test scores are standardized to have mean zero and unit variance. ‘Grade attainment’ 
refers to highest grade attained; ‘elementary grade repetition’, ‘attended secondary school’ and ‘paid work whilst at elementary school’ are all binary variables. Sample selection is as in Table 3, 
with the exception that selection is on siblings aged 15-21 in this table.  
 
Appendix Table A2: The Impact of Ability on Schooling and Child Labour Participation 
Sensitivity Analysis: Brothers Only and Sisters Only Samples 
(Sample: all children aged 15-30 who have quit school from families with two or more such children) 
Income generating work 
Grade Attainment Elementary Grade Repetition Age at Enrolment Age Quit School Attended Secondary School during elementary school
Panel A: Brothers
Pooled Estimates
Test score 0.627 -0.093 -0.081 0.467 0.107 0.019
(0.118) (0.024) (0.039) (0.146) (0.024) (0.018)
Number of children 482 482 482 482 482 482
Panel B: Brothers
Within Family Estimates
Test score 0.291 -0.075 -0.111 0.388 0.057 -0.009
(0.109) (0.029) (0.051) (0.202) (0.029) (0.022)
Number of children 482 482 482 482 482 482
Number of families 218 218 218 218 218 218
Panel C: Sisters
Pooled Estimates
Test score 0.630 -0.068 -0.076 0.501 0.058 -0.004
(0.123) (0.028) (0.054) (0.167) (0.023) (0.014)
Number of children 415 415 415 415 415 415
Panel D: Sisters
Within Family Estimates
Test score 0.397 -0.115 0.054 0.428 0.038 -0.005
(0.179) (0.037) (0.076) (0.210) (0.034) (0.020)
Number of children 415 415 415 415 415 415
Number of families 188 188 188 188 188 188
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the family level, in brackets. Each regression in Panel A includes sibling is oldest dummies, number of children age 0-14 in the household, head and spouse 
education dummies, head and spouse test scores as well as age, state and four community size dummies; missing head and spouse test scores are set to zero and missing dummies included; 
missing spouse education dummies are also included. The within family regression in Panel B include sibling is oldest and age dummies. Test scores are standardized to have mean zero and unit 
variance. ‘Grade attainment’ refers to highest grade attained; ‘elementary grade repetition’, ‘attended secondary school’ and ‘Income generating work during elementary school’ are all binary 
variables. Sample selection is as in Table 3, with the exception that only one sex is kept before performing the selection. 
Appendix Table A3: The Effect of Child Labour on Long-term Health Outcomes 
Sensitivity Analysis: Age 15-21 Sample 
(Sample: male children – still at school as well as those who have quit school – aged 15-21 from families with two or more brothers in this age range) 
Pooled estimates
Income generating work during 0.084 0.082 0.099 0.044 0.041 0.066 0.119 0.117 0.173 0.117 0.115 0.096
          elementary school (0.076) (0.077) (0.079) (0.046) (0.045) (0.047) (0.088) (0.088) (0.097) (0.088) (0.089) (0.088)
Test score -0.043 -0.052 -0.025 -0.031 -0.024 -0.009 -0.034 -0.045
(0.026) (0.029) (0.015) (0.017) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
Occupation and sector controls YES YES YES YES
Within estimates
Income generating work during 0.171 0.176 0.178 0.095 0.091 0.115 0.088 0.092 0.120 0.180 0.180 0.132
          elementary school (0.130) (0.132) (0.136) (0.057) (0.058) (0.063) (0.134) (0.134) (0.139) (0.119) (0.119) (0.127)
Test score 0.030 0.027 -0.028 -0.019 0.019 0.032 -0.002 -0.008
(0.034) (0.037) (0.020) (0.022) (0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.040)
Occupation and sector controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 457 457 457 404 404 404 457 457 457 457 457 457
Number of families 217 217 217 191 191 191 217 217 217 217 217 217
Ill last four weeks 
 (= 1 if had one of 7 conditions)
Acute morbidity
(=1 had if one of 15 illnesses) (1= Better than others; 5=Worse)
Relative health 
(1=very good; 5=very bad)
Rate own health 
 
 
(table continues overleaf) 
Table A3 (cont.) 
Pooled estimates
Income generating work during 0.048 0.048 0.043 0.086 0.086 0.085 0.285 0.282 0.252
          elementary school (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.125) (0.121) (0.139)
Test score 0.002 -0.013 -0.005 -0.010 0.107 0.108
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.048) (0.053)
Occupation and sector controls YES YES YES
Within estimates
Income generating work during 0.104 0.104 0.077 0.034 0.035 0.015 0.157 0.160 0.137
          elementary school (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.150) (0.151) (0.169)
Test score 0.003 -0.013 0.002 -0.004 0.015 0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.048) (0.057)
Occupation and sector controls YES YES YES
Observations 457 457 457 457 457 457 355 355 355
Number of families 217 217 217 217 217 217 169 169 169
 (standardised)
Height
(0=Never gloomy; 3=Always)
Emotional wellbeing 
 (yes / no)
Had serious health problems
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the family level, in brackets. For each of the seven health outcomes this table shows results from three regression each for the pooled and within family 
estimates. The first regression in each case excludes test scores and the adult/adolescent’s occupation and sector of employment dummies; the second regression adds test scores; the third 
regression adds test scores as well as occupation and sector dummies. The pooled estimates include sibling is oldest dummy, number of children age 0-14 in the household, head and spouse 
education dummies, head and spouse test scores, age, state and four community size dummies; missing head and spouse test scores are set to zero and missing dummies included; missing spouse 
education dummies are also included. The within family regressions includes age and sibling is oldest dummies. Test scores are standardized to have mean zero and unit variance. For definitions 
of the health outcomes, see Appendix A. See note to columns 7 to 9 in Table 1 for full details on the sample selection, the only difference being that selection is on brothers aged 15 to 21 in this 
table. 
